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INTRODUCTION 
The American Convention on Human Rights1 has consistently been 
identified by state parties, nonparties, commissioners, former judges, 
 
* The author intervened in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica as amicus curiae along with 
former Inter-American Court Judge Rafael Nieto Navia, and law professors Jane Adolphe 
and Richard Stith. The author wishes to thank Richard Stith for his wise suggestions on 
earlier drafts of this Article. 
1 Organization of American States, American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 21, 
1969, O.A.S.T.S. No. 36, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (entered into force July 18, 1978) 
[hereinafter American Convention]. 
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foreign courts, and observers of the Inter-American system on human 
rights, among others, as a pro-life treaty granting comprehensive 
protection to the unborn’s right to life.2 Previous Inter-American 
Court judges and commissioners have confirmed this understanding.3 
The Convention’s Article 4(1) reads as follows: “Every person has the 
right to have his life respected. This right shall be protected by law 
and, in general, from the moment of conception. No one shall be 
arbitrarily deprived of his life.” 
Nevertheless, in Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica,4 the Inter-
American Court interpreted the right to life from conception in the 
most restrictive possible manner, holding that, before implantation, 
the human embryo is not a person entitled to human rights protection 
under the American Convention,5 while redefining the term 
“conception” as implantation, not fertilization.6 The court also defined 
Article 4(1)’s terms “in general, from the moment of conception” to 
mean that only gradual or incremental protection should be given to 
prenatal life, depending on the unborn child’s physical stage of 
development. In addition, it held that “personal decisions” to produce 
 
2 See, e.g., Julio Barberis, El derecho a la vida en el pacto de San Jose de Costa Rica 
(The right to life in the San Jose, Costa Rica Pact), in OS RUMOS DO DIRETIO 
INTERNACIONAL DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS; ENSAIOS EM HOMANEGEM AO PROFESSOR 
ANTÔNIO AUGUSTO CANÇADO TRINDADE: LIBER AMICORUM CANÇADO TRINDADE 20 
(Renato Zerbini Ribeiro Leão et al. eds., 2005). 
3 See Rafael Nieto Navia, Aspectos Internacionales de la demanda contra la 
penalización del aborto [International aspects of the lawsuit against criminalization of 
abortion], 21–42, REVISTA PERSONA Y BIOÉTICA, Vol. 9, No. 1 (24) (Colom.) (2005), 
cited in Ricardo Bach de Chazal, Inconstitucionalidad y No Convencionalidad Del Aborto 
Voluntario [Unconstitutionality and unconventionality of voluntary abortion], NOTIVIDA 
8 (July 2011), at 9, http://www.notivida.org/Articulos/Aborto/INCONSTITUCIONALID 
AD%20Y%20NO%20CONVENCIONALIDAD%20DEL%20ABORTO%20VOLUNTA
RIO.pdf; see also Concurring Opinion Regarding The Judgment of The Inter-American 
Court of Human Rights in The Case of the Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 160, P. 61 (Nov. 25, 2006) (where Judge Cançado 
Trindade lamented “the extreme pre-natal violence, put in evidence in the brutalities to 
which pregnant women were submitted in the Castro-Castro prison,” as he wondered about 
“the consequences of this situation of extreme violence in the mind-or the subconscious-of 
the children born from the mother’s womb so disrespected and violated, even before their 
birth”); see also Baby Boy v. United States, Case 2141, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report 
No. 23/81, OEA/Ser.L./V/II.54, doc. 9 rev. ¶ 1 (1980–81) (Marco Gerardo Monroy Cabra, 
Comm’r, dissenting), available at http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/80.81eng/USA2141b 
.htm. 
4 Artavia Murillo et al. v. Costa Rica, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations, and 
Costs, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 257 (Nov. 28, 2012) [hereinafter 
Artavia], available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_257_esp.pdf. 
5 Id. at ¶ 223. 
6 Id. at ¶ 189. 
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biological children by in vitro fertilization (IVF) were protected under 
the American Convention on Human Rights,7 thus opening the way to 
a future proclamation of a broad right to personal decisions to choose 
state-funded abortion. 
This paper explores the decision’s potential impact in the creation 
of abortion rights in Costa Rica and other states parties to the 
American Convention,8 and its effects on a wider weakening of the 
right to life in the Inter-American system of human rights. 
I 
THE UNBORN CHILD’S RIGHT TO LIFE IN ARTICLE 4(1) OF THE 
AMERICAN CONVENTION ACCORDING TO ARTAVIA V. COSTA RICA 
A. Abortion in Artavia 
Although the Artavia complaint dealt exclusively with the issue of 
in vitro fertilization, the judgment also dealt with legalization of 
abortion, an issue that was immaterial to the complaint. The court 
inappropriately read Article 4(1)’s terms “in general, from the 
moment of conception” to mean that “gradual” or “incremental” 
protection should be given to prenatal life, depending on the unborn 
child’s physical stage of development,9 thus allowing abortion under 
at least some circumstances.10 Judge Vio Grossi suggested that the 
rationale used by the majority was obviously intended to legitimize 
elective abortion.11 
Although the court failed to create a right to abortion under the 
Convention, or to enunciate any state duties to create exceptions to 
abortion bans, its interpretation of Article 4(1) is erroneous for several 
 
7 Id. at ¶¶ 136–162. 
8 States parties to the American Convention on Human Rights (a total of twenty-three 
nations as of December 2013) are: Argentina, Barbados, Bolivia, Brazil, Chile, Colombia, 
Costa Rica, Dominica, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, El Salvador, Grenada, Guatemala, 
Haiti, Honduras, Jamaica, Mexico, Nicaragua, Panama, Paraguay, Peru, Suriname and 
Uruguay. Nonparties include: Antigua and Barbuda, Bahamas, Belize, Cuba, Venezuela, 
Guyana, St. Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, St. Vincent and the Grenadines, and Trinidad 
and Tobago. Canada and the United States, although members of the Organization of 
American States (O.A.S.), have not ratified the American Convention either. Inter-
American Commission on Human Rights, B-32: American Convention on Human Rights, 
CIDH.OAS.ORG, http://www.cidh.oas.org/Basicos/English/Basic4.Amer.Conv.Ratif.htm 
(last visited Oct. 25, 2013). 
9 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶ 256. 
10 Id. at ¶¶ 257–264. 
11 Id. at 19 (Vio Grossi, J., dissenting). 
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reasons. First, the text of Article 4(1) recognizes a right to life “from 
the moment of conception” (emphasis added), clearly indicating that 
the states intended to grant full protection to the unborn child from a 
distinctive moment onwards, not gradually or incrementally, as the 
court alleged. The judge’s personal opinion may be that the human 
embryo is an individual under construction that only becomes a 
person in stages.12 The Convention, however, grants full human rights 
protection to the human embryo from the moment of conception, 
recognizing its continual existence regardless of its stage of human 
development.13 
While the court rejected the personhood of the human embryo 
before implantation in the womb, it does implicitly grant that, after 
implantation, the embryo may be entitled to such recognition in a 
“gradual and incremental” manner.14 The Court seems to espouse the 
premise that the same embryo somehow gets transformed from non-
person to person at implantation in the maternal womb or gradually 
thereafter, even though, from a scientific perspective, the human 
embryo continues to be the same embryo at implantation and does not 
undergo any substantial changes upon it.15 In regard to this outdated 
perception of embryonic life, Professor Robert P. George has written 
that implantation does not act on the embryo “in such a way as to 
produce a new character or new direction of growth,”16 implantation 
does not transform the developing organism from one kind of entity 
into another. The same organism or distinct biological unit does not 
essentially change or morph into a different entity, i.e., a person, upon 
implantation for the purposes of the Convention.17 Similarly, no 
maternal action changes the human embryo from a non-person into a 
 
12 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 163, 183. See also Richard Stith, Construction vs. 
Development: A Source of Deep Misunderstanding Concerning the Beginning of Life, 
KENNEDY INST.  ETHICS J. (forthcoming) (on “construction” versus “development” models 
of perceiving the human embryo’s status). 
13 San José Articles, Article 2 (last visited Jan. 10, 2014), http://www.sanjose 
Articles.com/?page_id=2#sthash.4ytN3Zls.dpuf. 
14 Id. See also Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶ 256. 
15 Robert P. George & Christopher Tollefsen, Embryonic Debate: A Reply to William 
Saletan, Liberal Bioethics Writer, Former Embryo, NATIONAL REVIEW ONLINE (Feb. 11, 
2008), http://www.nationalreview.com/articles/223640/embryonic-debate/robert-p-george. 
16 Id. 
17 Guanajuato Declaration About ‘In Vitro’ Fertilization, ¶ II (Apr. 20, 2013), 
[hereinafter Guanajuato Declaration] (The Guanajuato Declaration reacts to the A Court 
holding in Artavia by pointing out that the human embryo’s life is, from its inception, 
human, its nature is not modified or perfected by reason of its development.), available at 
http://declaraciondeguanajuato.org/english.php. 
2014] The Inter-American Court on Human Rights’ Judgment 229 
in Artavia Murillo v. Costa Rica and Its Implications for the Creation 
of Abortion Rights in the Inter-American System of Human Rights 
person. That is because it was always a person, from the moment of 
fertilization.18 
Second, the court’s restrictive and creative interpretation of “in 
general” in the context of IVF is significantly inconsistent with its 
own jurisprudence on the right to life and the non-restrictive 
interpretation thereof, as indicated by Judge Vio Grossi.19 Before 
Artavia, the Inter-American Court had noted that the right to life has 
been narrowly interpreted too often.20 In both Villagrán Morales and 
Others v. Guatemala and Gomez Paquiyauri, the court held that 
the right to life is a fundamental human right, and the exercise of 
this right is essential for the exercise of all other human rights. If it 
is not respected, all rights lack meaning. Owing to the fundamental 
nature of the right to life, restrictive approaches to it are 
inadmissible.21 
Costa Rica pointed out that a minimally restrictive interpretation of 
the term “in general,” regarding the unborn, could excuse or permit 
abortion where a mother’s right to life is at stake, or when the death 
of the unborn is unintended, but arguing that protection “in general” is 
compatible with elective and intentional abortions would stretch 
interpretation much too far.22 Judge Vio Grossi, in his dissenting 
opinion, lamented that, through such an interpretation, the court 
would deprive the American Convention’s express provision 
protecting the unborn of its effet utile, which was to give ample 
protection to the unborn child, not “exceptional” as stated in 
Artavia.23 Scholars have agreed that Artavia trivialized the human 
embryo’s life and subordinated it to other interests (parental wishes, 
 
18 For an explanation of the fallacy of imagining that the nature of a thing changes in 
the course of its development, see George & Tollefsen, supra note 15. 
19 Castro Prison v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) 
No. 160, ¶ 61 (Nov. 25, 2006). 
20 See, e.g., Case of the “Street Children” (Villagrán-Morales et al.) v. Guatemala, 
Merits, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 63, ¶ 3 (Nov. 19, 1999) (“The right to life cannot 
keep on being conceived restrictively, as it was in the past, by reference only to the 
prohibition of the arbitrary deprivation of physical life. We believe that there are distinct 
ways to deprive a person arbitrarily of life: when his death is provoked directly by the 
unlawful act of homicide, as well as when circumstances are not avoided which likewise 
leao word to the death of persons as in the cas d’espèce.”). 
21 Id. at ¶ 144. See also Gómez-Paquiyauri Brothers v. Peru, Judgement, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) No. 110, ¶ 2. (July 8, 2004). 
22 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶ 168. 
23 Id. at ¶¶ 7, 19–20 (Vio Grossi, J., dissenting). 
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privacy), potentially justifying, in theory, abortion or other embryo 
destructive acts.24 
Judge Vio Grossi did not even believe that the term “in general” 
was meant to create exceptions to the unborn’s right to life. He 
understood the term as a synonym of “common,” and stated that it 
was simply meant to extend right to life protection to the unborn, 
perhaps in a different manner than that given after birth, but to 
include rather than exclude the unborn in any case.25 Former Judge 
Julio Barberis also suggested the term “in general” could be read this 
way. He said Mexico’s reservation to the treaty, which states that the 
term “in general” would not entail the obligation to legislate in favor 
of the right to life from conception at the federal level, is evidence 
that the majority of states parties read the terms to contain an 
obligation or permission to protect the unborn, rather than an 
obligation to allow their destruction.26 Judge Augusto Cançado 
Trindade also understood the expression in a minimally restrictive 
way. He suggested that domestic laws allowing abortion and defining 
conception as the beginning of life may be one of the reasons why 
some states, like the United States or Canada, have not ratified the 
Convention.27 Other commentators have pointed out that states parties 
to the American Convention did not or do not understand “in general” 
as permitting abortion. Author Ricardo Bach de Cazal has indicated 
that the acceptance of the terms “and, in general, from the moment of 
conception” by states parties was simply meant to emphasize that the 
right to life extended to the unborn, from conception, in equality of 
conditions, in every instance.28 
 
24 Luis Alejandro Silva Irarrázaval, La protección de la vida humana entre paréntesis; 
Comentario crítico a la sentencia Artavia Murillo y otros (“fecundación in vitro”) vs. 
Costa Rica, de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, ANUARIO DE DERECHO 
PUBLICO, UNIVERSIDAD DIEGO PORTALES 383, 394–95 (2013) [hereinafter La 
Proteccion] (Chile) (The parenthetical protection of human life. Critical commentary to 
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights´ judgment in Artavia Murillo and others v. 
Costa Rica). 
25 Artavia, supra note 4, at 7–8 (Vio Grossi, J., dissenting). 
26 Julio Barberis, El derecho a la vida en el pacto de San Jose de Costa Rica, in OS 
RUMOS DO DIREITO INTERNACIONAL DOS DIREITOS HUMANOS; ENSAIOS EM 
HOMANEGEM AO PROFESSOR ANTONIO AUGUSTO CANCADO TRINDADE: LIBER 
AMICORUM CANCADO TRINDADE 12 (Renato Zerbini Ribeiro Leão et al. eds., 2005). See 
also Alvaro Paúl, Controversial Conceptions: The Unborn and the American Convention 
on Human Rights, 9 LOY. U. CHI. INT’L L. REV. 209–47 (2012). 
27 Lauri R. Tanner, Interview with Judge Antônio A. Cançado Trindade, A Court of 
Human Rights, XVI ANN. SURV. INT’L & COMP. L. 165, 177 (2010). 
28 Ricardo Bach de Chazal, El aborto en el derecho positivo argentino [Abortion in 
positive Argentinian Law], EL DERECHO, 199 (2009) (Arg.). 
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In any case, even if states were allowed to create narrow 
exceptions to the unborn’s “general” right to life from conception, 
there is certainly no state duty to create them. The words in general 
are preceded by the terms “protected by law,” which indicates that 
exceptions to the enforcement of the right to life from conception 
would be permissible, not to the legal recognition of the right to life 
itself. Even where exceptions to the enforcement or legal protection 
of the right to life of unborn children may be permissible, they are 
never required under the Convention. Such a reading would be 
incompatible with the object and purpose of the Convention, which is 
to protect the right to life, not mandate violations thereof. The court 
has held that “the fundamental criterion which creates the very nature 
of human rights requires that the norms which guarantee or extend 
human rights be broadly interpreted and those that limit or restrict 
human rights be narrowly interpreted.”29 The Commission has also 
stated that, in order to prevent human rights restrictions from 
becoming the rule rather than the exception, the broadest rule and the 
most extensive interpretations have to be applied when recognizing 
human rights.30 However, the majority opinion’s claim in Artavia, 
that the object and purpose of the treaty was to permit exceptions to 
the right to life from conception,31 rather than protect it, illustrates the 
very effect described by the Commission. 
If acquiesced in by future domestic and international courts, the 
court’s restrictive interpretation of the right to life in Artavia may 
contribute to the erosion of the fundamental character of the right to 
life “as the supreme right of the human being, and the conditio sine 
qua non to the enjoyment of all other rights.”32 Scholars have pointed 
out that the Inter-American Court’s limitations on the right to life as 
imposed in Artavia are unprecedented: for the first time, the court 
declared the right to life to apply to some human beings, and not 
 
29 Enforceability of the Right to Reply or Correction (Arts. 14(1), 1(1), and 2, 
American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion Oc-7/85, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
(ser. A) ¶ 36 (Aug. 29, 1986). 
30 See, e.g., Jorge, José & Dante Peirano Basso, Eastern Republic of Uruguay, Case 
12.553, Inter-Am Comm’n. H.R., Report No. 86/09, ¶ 75 (Aug. 6, 2009). 
31 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶ 258. 
32 Medellín, Ramírez Cardenas and Leal García v. United States, Case 12.644, Inter-
Am. Comm’n H.R., Organization of American States, Report No. 90/09, 
OEA/Ser.L/V/II.135, doc. 37, ¶¶ 122–123 (2009), available at http://www.cidh.org/annual 
rep/2009eng/US 12644eng.htm. 
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others,33 as requested by the petitioners.34 The Manifiesto de San José 
characterized the judgment as a “dangerous precedent” for that 
reason.35 The “relativization” of right to life36 versus the absolute 
character given to autonomy may eventually undermine the court’s 
understanding of the right to life in general.37 
B. One-Sided, Evolving Interpretation of Article 4(1) 
Rather than focusing on Latin American state practice on abortion, 
as Article 31 of the Vienna Convention requires, the court relied again 
on judicial decisions favoring abortion in non-parties to the American 
Convention, including the United States and European states like 
Germany and Spain. The court also relied on the European court on 
Human Rights and the Council of Europe38 to conclude that the 
American Convention could not have granted an unqualified right to 
life to the human embryo. The reliance on these judgments was 
strongly criticized by Judge Vio Grossi.39 
Putting aside the issue of whether United States domestic courts or 
European courts have any authority as sources of interpretation of the 
American Convention, the court cited only those decisions that 
 
33 La Proteccion, supra note 24, at 387. See also Ian Henríquez Herrera, Comentario al 
Fallo de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos en el caso Artavia Murillo y otros 
[Comment to the Inter-American Court Judgment in Artavia Murillo and Others], III 
REVISTA INTERNACIONAL DE DERECHOS HUMANOS 55, (2013) (Arg.) (forthcoming), 
http://ojs.revistaidh.org/ridh. 
34 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 258–263. See also Ana Victoria Sanchez Villalobos and 
Others v. Costa Rica, Petition 12.361, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., Report No. 25/04, 
OEA/Ser.L./V/II.122, doc. 5 rev. ¶¶ 20-21 (Mar. 11, 2004). (Admissibility Report), 
available at http://www.cidh.org/women/CostaRica.12361sp.htm; see Gerardo Gómez, 
Aída Marcela Garita et al. v. Costa Rica, Petition 1368-04, Inter-Am. Comm’n H.R., 
Report No. 156/10, OEA/ser.L./V/II.122, ¶ 35 (2010) (Admissibility Report) [hereinafter 
Gomez Garita], http://www.cidh.org/annualrep/2010eng/crad1368-04en.doc. 
35 See Manifiesto de San José [San Jose Manifesto], ENCUENTRO MATRIMONIAL 
MUNDIAL COSTA RICA ) ¶ 6 (last visited Nov. 15, 2013), http://www.encuentro 
matrimonialcr.org/nuevo-een-2013/manifiestosanjose1-8.pdf. 
36 Jorge Nicolás Lafferriere, Invisibilizar al embrión ante los intereses biotecnológicos 
[Invisibilizing the embryo before biotechnological interests], 245 REVISTA JURIDICA LA 
LEY [L.L.] 1, 3 (2012). 
37 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 258–259, 262. For more comment on this aspect, see Luis 
Alejandro Silva Irarrázaval, La protección de la vida humana entre paréntesis. 
Comentario crítico a la sentencia Artavia Murillo y otros (“fecundación in vitro”) vs. 
Costa Rica, de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [The parenthetical 
protection of human life. Critical commentary to the Inter-American Court on Human 
Rights´ judgment in Artavia Murillo and others v. Costa Rica]. ANUARIO DE DERECHO 
PÚBLICO, UNIVERSIDAD DIEGO PORTALES 383, 387 (2013) (Chile). 
38 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 245–253. 
39 Id. at 17–18 (Vio Grossi, J., dissenting). 
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favored abortion rights in those jurisdictions, while ignoring the 
jurisdictions that were not in favor. The German Constitutional Court, 
for instance, repeatedly affirmed the constitutional right to life of the 
unborn, even in the embryonic stage.40 This Court interpreted the term 
“everyone” in its Constitution (Article 2(2) of the Grundgesetz: 
“everyone possesses the right to life”) to include the unborn human 
being.41 A 1975 decision spoke of the legal irrelevance of distinctions 
among the various stages of “self-developing life” (sich 
entwickelnden Lebens).42 In 1993, the court reaffirmed most of that 
earlier judgment, holding that discussion of the unborn concerns “an 
individual life, one that in the process of growing and unfolding itself 
does not develop into a human being but rather develops as a human 
being,” with its “own” (“eigenen”) constitutional right to life. 43 The 
Inter-American Court also ignored that German law protects non-
implanted embryos against lethal experimentation.44 
Similarly, the judgment imitated the United States Supreme 
Court’s reasoning in Roe v. Wade,45 by declaring that the Convention 
required a balancing test between the rights and interests at stake46 
thereby reducing the human embryo’s life to a mere “interest” in this 
 
40 See Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] Feb. 25, 
1975, 39 Entscheidinsen des Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerfG] 1, translated in Robert 
E. Jonas & John D. Gorby, West German Abortion Decision: A Contrast to Roe v. Wade, 9 
J. MARSHALL J. OF PRAC. & PROC. 551, 605–84 (1976), and see 
Bundesverwaltungsgericht [BVerfG] [Federal Constitutional Court] May 28, 1993, 88 
Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVerfGE] 203 (Second Senate), in 1993 
Europäische Grundrechte Zeitschrift [EUGRZ] 229. The German court indicated, however, 
that it was making no judgment about the nature or rights of the embryo prior to 
implantation because this matter was not at issue in the cases before it. But cf. The general 
protection of the preimplantation embyo in German statutory law, Embryonenschutzgesetz 
(ESCHG) [Law on the Protection of Embryos], Bundesgezetzblatt Dec. 19, 1990, BGRI I 
at 2746 (Ger.). 
41 MARTIN RHONHEIMER & PAOLO G. CAROZZA, Fundamental Rights, Moral Law, and 
the Legal Defense of Life in a Constitutional Democracy 151 (Working Paper No. 849, 
1998), available at http://scholarship.law.nd.edu/law_faculty_scholarship/849. 
42 39 BVERFGE 1 (37), translated in Richard Stith, Construction vs. Development: A 
Source of Deep Misunderstanding Concerning the Beginning of Life, KENNEDY INST. 
ETHICS J. (forthcoming 2015). 
43 88 BVERFGE 203, (251–52), translated in Richard Stith, Construction vs. 
Development: A Source Of Deep Misunderstanding Concerning The Beginning Of Life, 
KENNEDY INST. ETHICS J. (forthcoming 2015). 
44 Embryonenschutzgesetz (ESCHG) [Law on the Protection of Embryos], supra note 
40. 
45 See Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶ 262. 
46 Id. at ¶ 263. 
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case, rather than a right.47 But it left out Roe’s admission that, were 
the unborn found to be persons, they would have been entitled to 
human rights protection:48 “If this suggestion [that a fetus is a 
“person”] is established, [Roe]’s case, of course collapses, for the 
fetus’ right to life would then be guaranteed specifically by the 
Amendment.”49 Roe’s creation of abortion rights within a right to 
privacy may have inspired the Artavia court, but the U.S. Supreme 
Court has stopped using the “privacy” rationale after Planned 
Parenthood of Southeastern Pa. v. Casey.50 Furthermore, the 
judgment failed to mention subsequent U.S. Supreme Court case law, 
like Gonzales v. Carhart, upholding a federal ban on partial-birth 
abortion, where the court referred to the unborn as an “unborn child” 
and a “baby,”51 and to “the State’s interest in promoting respect for 
human life at all stages in the pregnancy.”52 The judgment ignored 
post-Roe U.S. federal statutes, such as the Unborn Victims of 
Violence Act, that has continued to protect the unborn from the 
moment of conception, understood as fertilization, in contexts where 
Roe did not apply.53 
The evolving interpretation analysis also mentioned three Latin 
American high court decisions that legalized abortion under limited 
circumstances54 but left out three Mexican Supreme Court decisions 
upholding state amendments protecting the right to life from 
conception55 and five high court decisions banning emergency 
 
47 Id. at ¶ 260. 
48 Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113, 156–57 (1973). 
49 Id. 
50 See Gonzales v. Carhart, 550 U.S. 124, 170–72 (2007) (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) 
(categorizing legal abortion as a matter of autonomy rather than privacy, in virtue of 
Eisenstadt v. Baird, 405 U.S. 438, 453, (1972)). See also Planned Parenthood of 
Southeastern Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, (1992). 
51 Gonzales, supra note 50, at 124, 134, 138–39. 
52 Id. at 124, 163. 
53 Unborn Victims Of Violence Act, 18 U.S.C.A § 1841(d) (2004) (defining “an unborn 
child” as “a member of the species homo sapiens, at any stage of development, who is 
carried in the womb”) (emphasis added). 
54 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 172–262. 
55 See Mexico: Supreme Court Upholds State Pro-Life Protections, PARLIAMENTARY 
NETWORK FOR CRITICAL ISSUES (Sept. 2011), http://www.pncius.org/newsletter.aspx 
?id=52; see also Piero Tozzi, Analysis: Unborn in Mexico Dodge Bullet–For Now, C-
FAM.FAM (Oct. 6, 2011), http://E.c-fam.org/en/2011/6821-analysis-unborn-in-mexico      
-dodge-bullet-for-now; Matthew Hoffman, Turn-around victory: Mexican Supreme Court 
upholds state pro-life laws, LIFESITE (May 3, 2013, 01:54 PM), http://www.lifesitenews 
.com/news/turn-around-victory-mexican-supreme-court-upholds-state-pro-life-laws/; 
México: Suprema Corte ratifica blindaje de vida ante aborto en 18 estados, ACIPRENSA 
(May 3, 2013, 03:34 PM), http://www.aciprensa.com/noticias/mexico-suprema-corte          
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contraception.56 Evidently, the mere existence of judicial decisions 
favoring abortion in states parties does not create abortion rights 
under the American Convention. In Advisory Opinion OC-14/94,57 
the Inter-American Court on Human Rights held that the existence of 
domestic laws validating violations of human rights do not justify a 
breach of the American Convention;58 therefore, three decisions on 
abortion cannot justify its validation under the American Convention. 
Furthermore, the three decisions it enumerated do not represent a 
regional consensus on the issue, an essential element of an evolving 
interpretation.59 Judge Pérez Pérez once complained that the Inter-
American Court had dismissed the need of reaching a consensus 
 
-ratifica-blindaje-de-vida-ante-aborto-en-18-estados-53077/#.UZpmmWzD8dU; Mexican 
Supreme Court Strikes Down State Pro-Life Constitutional Amendment, LIFESITE (Apr. 
30, 2013, 5:09 PM), https://www.lifesitenews.com/news/mexican-supreme-court-strikes    
-down-state-pro-life-constitutional-amendment. 
56 Corte Suprema de Justicia de la Nación [CSJN] [National Supreme Court of Justice], 
03/05/2002, “Portal de Belén–Asociación Civil sin Fines de Lucro c. Ministerio de Salud y 
Acción Social de la Nación s/ amparo,” [Fallos] (Arg.), http://www.csjn.gov.ar/confal 
/ConsultaCompletaFallos.do?method=verDocumentos&id=516601; Corte Suprema de 
Justicia [C.S.J.] [Supreme Court], 30/8/2001 “Philippi Izquierdo con Laboratorio Chile 
S.A.,” Rol: 2186-2001 and Tribunal Constitucional [T.C.] [Constitutional Court], 
18/4/2008 Requerimiento de Inconstitucionalidad Deducidoinconstitucionalidad deducido 
en Contracontra de Algunas Disposicionesalgunas disposiciones de las “Normas 
Nacionales Sobre Regulación de la Fertilidad,” aprobadas por el Decreto Supremo No. 48, 
de 2007, del Ministerio de Salud, Rol de la causa: 740n07 (Chile), http://www.tribunal 
constitucional.cl/wp/descargar_expediente.php ?id=34407; Corte Suprema de Justicia de la 
República de Honduras [Supreme Court of Honduras], Dictamen Decreto 54-2009, 21 de 
junio 2012 (Hond.), http://www.womenslinkworldwide.org/wlw/new.php?modo 
=observatorio&id_decision=438; Tribunal Constitucional [Constitutional Court], 2214 de 
junio 2006, “José Fernando Roser Rohde con Instituto Nacional de Higiene y Medicina 
Tropical “Leopoldo Izquieta Pérez” y el Ministro de Salud S/ Acción de Amparo” Caso 
No. 0014-2005-RA, pp. 22–26 (Ecuador), http://www.derechoecuador.com/productos 
/producto/catalogo/registros-oficiales/2006/junio/code/18651/registro-oficial-22-de-junio  
-del-2006-suplemento#anchor330581; Tribunal Constitucional, [T.C.] [Constitutional 
Court] 16 octubre 2009, ONG “Acción de Lucha Anticorrupcion” Sentencia del Tribunal 
Constitucional, EXP. No. 02005-2009-PA/TC, ¶ 12 (Peru), available at http://www.tc.gob 
.pe/jurisprudencia/2009/02005-2009-AA.html. 
57 International Responsibility for the Promulgation and Enforcement of Laws in 
Violation of the Convention (Arts. 1 and 2 American Convention on Human Rights), 
Advisory Opinion OC-14/94, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 14, ¶ 35 (Dec. 9, 1994), 
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/opiniones/seriea_14_ing.pdf. 
58 Id. 
59 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 17–18 (Vio Grossi, J., dissenting). 
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among the States Party to the ACHR before considering that the 
treaty has evolved,60 as it seems to be the case in Artavia. 
II 
POTENTIAL EFFECTS OF THE ARTAVIA JUDGMENT IN THE 
CREATION OF ABORTION RIGHTS IN THE INTER-AMERICAN 
SYSTEM 
The Artavia holding is both broad and narrow, and its effects in 
depriving the unborn of human rights protection in the Inter-
American system may be manifested accordingly. It is broad in the 
sense that, even though it is not directly applicable to abortion laws or 
laws on abortifacients, some of the very broad language on abortion 
might, and probably will, be used by abortion rights advocates to 
support claims for legalization of emergency contraception. It may 
also be used to promote access to reproductive technologies as a 
human right, favoring the commercial interests of the biotechnology 
industry.61 The decision has already prompted such lawsuits in at least 
one Latin American domestic jurisdiction.62 But the judgment’s 
effects on the creation of abortion rights in the Inter-American system 
of human rights remain unclear. 
It can be expected that some of Judge García-Sayán’s broad 
rhetoric on privacy as a supreme right that prevails over all others63 
and his reiterated claim that the right to life can be subject to multiple 
limitations64 can and will be used to politically pressure states to 
recognize abortion rights, particularly those that have comprehensive 
bans on abortion. The decision’s redefinition of conception as 
implantation would leave room for protection of the human embryo 
after implantation, e.g., even in selective abortions following IVF, but 
 
60 Atala Riffo and Daughters v. Chile, Merits, Reparations, and Costs, Judgment, Inter-
Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 239 (Feb. 24, 2012) ¶ 20 (Pérez Pérez, J., partially dissenting), 
available at http://corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_239_ing.pdf. 
61 See Lafferriere, Jorge Nicolás, La Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos y un 
Injusto Fallo Sobre el embrión humano ante las Biotecnologías [The Inter-American 
Court on Human Rights and an unjust ruling on the human embryo confronting 
biotechnology], Revista de Derecho de Familia y las Personas, ¶ 9, La Ley [L.L.] (2013) 
(Arg.) (pointing out that the judgment may indirectly benefit the embryo market 
biotechnology industry). See also Guanajuato Declaration, C-FAM.ORG (Aug. 27, 2010), 
available at http://c-fam.org/docLib/20100908_declaracion_guanajuato_ing-1.pdf. 
62 See Juzgado Federal de Salta No. 1 [Federal court of Salta N. 1], 8/7/2013, “Lodi 
Ortiz Andrea Melisa–Larran Cristian c. Swiss Medical s/ Amparo,” Expte. No. 
61000007/13, La Ley [L.L.] (Arg.). 
63 Artavia, supra note 4, at ¶¶ 278–279, 326. 
64 Id. at ¶¶ 258–259, 261–262. 
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the statements on a gradual, incremental approach, suggest that the 
younger the embryo or fetus in question, the more likely the court 
would be to validate his destruction. 
It appears that most members of the Commission and the Inter-
American Court are currently unwilling to give the unborn’s right to 
life any meaningful protection under the Convention, but the outcome 
of future litigation may not be as predictable as one may think. For 
instance, in May 2013, a request for abortion as a provisional measure 
was filed before the Inter-American Court six months after Artavia on 
behalf of Beatriz, a lupus patient who allegedly wanted to have a late-
term abortion in El Salvador, a state that bans abortion under all 
circumstances.65 Interestingly enough, when ordering provisional 
measures, the court asked that El Salvador ensure she be given 
necessary medical treatment, not an abortion.66 This result was 
probably not based on a change of mind on the part of the court, but 
on the specific facts of the case and the impeccable logic of the 
national Supreme Court decision. 
A. Artavia’s Applicability in Costa Rica 
The Artavia’s holding itself is narrow in the sense that it does not 
apply anywhere outside of Costa Rica. Furthermore, the holding is 
unlikely to be directly on point in any other state party to the 
American Convention, given that no other country has an explicit ban 
on IVF and such a situation is now unlikely to repeat itself. Even if 
other court decisions mandating emergency contraception or abortion 
under some circumstances follow, other states parties may not be as 
willing as Costa Rica to comply with such a decision. 
In fact, under Article 29 of the American Convention, states that 
include the human embryo in the category of persons or give the 
human embryo greater protections than those stated in Artavia would 
certainly have no obligation to permit embryo-destructive 
technologies or abortion. Article 29 of the American Convention 
preempts the Court from “restricting the enjoyment or exercise of any 
right or freedom recognized by virtue of the laws of any State Party” 
and restricting “other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the 
 
65 Resolución de la Corte Interamericana de Derechos Humanos, Medidas 
Provisionales Respecto De El Salvador, 29/5/2013, Asunto B., available at http://www 
.corteidh.or.cr/docs/medidas/B_se_01.pdf. 
66 Id. at ¶ 9. 
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human personality.” Article 29 also codifies the pro homine principle: 
“No provision of this Convention shall be interpreted as . . . 
precluding other rights or guarantees that are inherent in the human 
personality or derived from representative democracy as a form of 
government.”67 This rule has been repeatedly applied by the Inter-
American Court to children and illegal immigrants,68 and may be used 
in favor of the human embryo, as pointed out by an Argentinian 
federal court.69 
The state has so far complied with many of the court’s 
recommendations: the Executive has produced a bill allowing and 
regulating in vitro fertilization and submitted it for congressional 
consideration, and the government has publicized the Inter-American 
Court decision, carried out trainings on sexual and reproductive rights 
for employees of the judiciary, and has ordered that reparations be 
paid to the petitionaries.70 As of February 2014, the actual regulation 
of the practice by Congress and the implementation of subsidized IVF 
services, however, remain uncompleted,71 perhaps due to the 
economic challenges that state-funded IVF would pose. 
Existing claims that all of the Artavia decision would be self-
executing in Costa Rican courts72 would directly contradict Article 
 
67 See Ticona Estrada et al. v. Bolivia Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. 
H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 11, (GarcíA-Sayán & Ramírez, J., concurring) (Nov. 27, 2008), available 
at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_191_ing.pdf); Raxcacó-Reyes v. 
Guatemala, Merits, Reparations and Costs, (ser. C) ¶ 12 (Ramírez, J.) (Sept. 15, 2005), 
available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_133_ing.pdf); Acevedo-
Jaramillo et al. v. Peru, Preliminary Objections, Merits, Reparations and Costs, Inter-Am. 
Ct. H.R. ¶ 283(a) (Feb. 7, 2006), available at http://www.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos 
/articulos/seriec_144_ing.pdf;); see also “Five Pensioners” v. Peru, Merits, Reparations, 
and Costs, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) ¶ 143(b) (Feb. 28, 2003), available at http://www 
.corteidh.or.cr/docs/casos/articulos/seriec_98_ing.pdf. 
68 See Juridical Condition and Rights of the Undocumented Migrants, Advisory 
Opinion OC-18/03, Inter-Am Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 18, ¶¶ 47, 78 (Sept. 17, 2003) 
(requested by the United Mexican States), available at http://www1.umn.edu 
/humanrts/iachr/series_A_OC-18.html;); see also Juridical Condition and Human Rights of 
the Child, Advisory Opinion OC-17/2002, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) No. 17, ¶¶ 30–31, 
(Trindade, J., concurring), (Aug. 28, 2002) (requested by the Inter-Commission on Human 
Rights), available at http://www1.umn.edu/humanrts/iachr/series_A_OC-17.html. 
69 “Lodi Ortiz Andrea Melisa–Larran Cristian,” supra note 62. 
70 See, e.g., Artavia decision posted on Costa Rica’s Supreme Court website, available 
at http://www.csjn.gov.ar/data/cidhfa.pdf. 
71 See Hubert May, El Estado incumple la sentencia FIV [the state failed to comply 
with IVF ruling], LA NACION, http://www.nacion.com/opinion/foros/incumple-sentencia   
-FIV_0_1360263964.html. 
72 See Jorge Oviedo, Costa Rica después de la sentencia de la CIDH en Artavia Murillo 
[Costa Rica after the ruling of the IACHR in Artavia Murillo], OBSERVATORIO 
INTERNACIONAL DE POLITICAS PUBLICAS Y FAMILIA (Feb. 14, 2014) (Arg.),  
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68(2) of the American Convention which limits a judgment’s direct 
effect to provisions on reparations.73 The specific reference to a 
particular section of the judgment in that Article clearly indicates that 
states did not intend for all of the judgment to be self-executing in 
domestic courts; therefore it is highly doubtful that the court’s 
statements on abortion, for instance, would be binding on Costa Rica. 
Only domestic law could provide for automatic, comprehensive 
compliance with Inter-American Court decisions, as illustrated by the 
former Executive Secretary of the IACHK, Santiago Cantón, who 
suggested that “states should pass internal legislation to ensure 
compliance with the decisions of the Commission and court.74 In the 
region, only Peru, Costa Rica, and Colombia have such legislation, 
though none of these States provide an ideal model to follow.”75 In 
Costa Rica’s case, Supreme Court precedent has established that only 
Congress, and not domestic courts, may order compliance with Inter-
American Court decisions.76 
It should be noted that the decision, like most Latin American 
judgments, does not make clear distinctions between the ratio 
decidendi and dicta in terms of their legal weight, perhaps because 
this distinction is not as important where a jurisprudence is not bound 
by the doctrine of stare decisis, traditionally the case for civil law 
 
http://observatoriointernacional.com/?p=1576 (where state attorney Oviedo describes 
status of current lawsuits before Costa Rican suits seeking further damages and judicial 
authorization for private practitioners to carry out IVF procedures, as well as 
administrative action against the Costa Rican social security system for delaying 
implementation of IVF subsidies). 
73 See Valentín Thury Cornejo, Revisión del Control de Convencionalidad Difuso y la 
Identidad Institucional de la Corte Interamericana [Review of diffuse control of 
conformity and institutional identity of the Inter-American Court], UCA/CONICET (last 
visited Jan. 10, 2014), http://cedecu.edu.uy/uploads/media/mdCategory/bebf264aa42b3aa 
85e5afdcd20370855.pdf. 
74 Santiago Cantón, To Strengthen Human Rights, Change the Organization of 
American States (Not the Commission) 3, http://digitalcommons.wcl.american.edu/cgi 
/viewcontent.cgi?Article=1836&context=hrbrief. 
75 Id. 
76 See Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema de Justicial [Constitutional Chamber of 
Supreme Court], Sentencia 05274, May 4, 2005, SISTEMA COSTARRICENSE DE 
INFORMACIÓN JURÍDICA (Costa Rica), http://jurisprudencia.poder-judicial.go.cr/SCIJ_PJ 
/busqueda/jurisprudencia/jur_Documento.aspx?param1=Ficha_Sentencia&nValor1=1&n 
Valor2=335617&strTipM=T&strDirSel=directo; Sala Constitucional de la Corte Suprema 
de Justicial [Constitutional Chamber of Supreme Court], Sentencia 14953, Nov. 2, 2011, 
SISTEMA COSTARRICENSE DE INFORMACIÓN JURÍDICA (Costa Rica), http://juris 
prudencia.poder-judicial.go.cr/SCIJ_PJ/busqueda/jurisprudencia/jur_Documento.aspx? 
param1=Ficha_Sentencia&nValor1=1&nValor2=525680&strTipM=T&strDirSel=directo. 
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nations. The distinction is, however, particularly important for 
common law states parties to the Convention, and should be taken 
into account when evaluating the weight of certain statements in 
international court decisions. Alvaro Paúl notes “[t]his distinction is 
fundamental for a court aspiring to have its precedents applied by 
domestic State bodies, as the Inter-American Court claims.”77 
A starting point for the distinction between ratio and dicta could be 
Article 68 of the Convention, which provides that only “[t]hat part of 
a judgment that stipulates compensatory damages,”78 that is, the 
dispositive section, may be directly executed by domestic courts. The 
fact that the judgment’s operative section made no mention 
whatsoever of Article 4(1), as pointed out by Judge Vio Grossi,79 
could mean that the Court’s interpretation of the right to life from 
conception would not have the same level of authority as the 
dispositive paragraphs. This would make the Artavia holding 
relatively narrow. In any case, in the absence of stare decisis, it seems 
unlikely that judges would be bound by the Court’s interpretation of 
the right to life from conception in Artavia.80 
B. Artavia’s Applicability in Latin American Jurisdictions 
Any claims that the Artavia decision would have a direct effect on 
other states parties to the Convention that were not parties to the 
dispute would be in direct contradiction with the treaty text itself.81 
The treaty, like other Romano-Germanic treaties, provides that states 
are bound only by decisions in cases to which they are parties. Article 
68(1) of the Convention leaves little room for doubt in that regard: 
“The states parties to the Convention undertake to comply with the 
judgment of the court in any case to which they are parties (emphasis 
 
77 This disregard for common law and Anglo-Saxon legal traditions is referred to as 
“hispanocentrism” in Alvaro Paúl, Decision-Making Process of the Inter-American Court: 
A Commentary Based on the “In Vitro Fertilization” Case 33–34 (draft), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2303637 (for more on the Inter-
American Court’s interpretation of Article 4(1) of the American Convention in Artavia). 
78 American Convention, supra note 1. 
79 Artavia, supra note 4, at 23 (Vio Grossi, J., dissenting). 
80 See, e.g., Álvaro Paúl, Giro En Materia De Recurso De Revisión Ante La Corte 
Interamericana (Twist on the Remedy of Revision Before the Inter-American Court), 
Revista Chilena de Derecho y Ciencia Política, Vol. 4, 131–38 (2013), http://ssrn.com 
/abstract=2333818, (commenting on the Inter-American Court’s departure from consistent 
precedent on the availability of revision before its chambers in the case of the Mapiripán 
massacre). 
81 See Cornejo, supra note 74. 
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added).” Thus, nonparties to a case are not automatically bound by 
Inter-American Court judgments. 
Some members of the Inter-American Court and Inter-American 
Commission have promoted the idea that their interpretations of the 
American Convention must prevail over domestic courts, but it is 
unlikely that Artavia will consolidate that kind of authority. Known as 
control de convencionalidad,82 or, as translated decisions call it, 
“control of conformity” or “control of compliance,”83 this doctrine 
was created in 2006 by Judge Diego García Sayán in Almonacid 
Arellano v. Chile84 and reiterated in subsequent court decisions85 and 
Commission communications.86 
The theory appears to have been copied from the European Court 
of Justice (ECJ), which has long insisted that its interpretations of 
European law are superior to national laws (including national 
constitutions) as well as directly effective in conferring individual 
rights and duties.87 Acceptance of the ECJ’s demands for unlimited 
supremacy of its treaty interpretations over the courts and nations of 
Europe has been neither complete nor unanimous, however. Early 
European treaties constituted a kind of economic and political union 
in which certain national powers had been surrendered by the 
signatory states, and the ECJ had been explicitly given the authority 
to interpret those delegated powers when called upon by a court to do 
 
82 See Diálogo jurisprudencial y control de convencionalidad: una mirada comparada 
[Judicial dialogue and control of conformity, a comparative outlook], Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. 
Panel (Oct. 11, 2013), available at http://vimeo.com/album/2565106 /video/76720365 (for 
further discussion of the control de convencionalidad doctrine). 
83 See Álvaro Paúl, Translation Challenges of the Inter-American Court of Human 
Rights and Cost-Effective Proposals for Improvement, 5 INTER-AM. & EUR. HUM. RTS. J. 
1, 3–26 (2012), available at http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2060897 (for a critique of the 
term’s translation). 
84 Arellano v. Chile, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C), No. 208 (Oct. 9, 2002). 
85 See Redilla Pacheco v. Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 65/05 (Oct. 12, 
2005); Cabrera Garcia  v. Mexico, Inter-Am. Ct. H. R. (ser. C) No. 11/04 ¶ 7, 12, 21 (Feb. 
24, 2004); Tamayo v. Peru,  Reparations, Inter-Am. Ct. H.R. (ser. C) No. 42 ¶ 35 (Nov. 
27, 1998). 
86 See also IACHR, Questionnaire to Consult the States and Civil Society for Drawing 
up the Annual Overview of the Human Rights Situation in the Hemisphere, 
http://www.oas.org/en/iachr/consultation/docs/cap4A-en.pdf (where IACHR requests 
official information on domestic laws, resolutions and judicial decisions incorporating this 
doctrine). 
87 See Richard Stith & J.H.H. Weiler, Can Treaty Law Be Supreme, Directly Effective 
and Autonomous–All at the Same Time? (An Epistolary eEhchange), 34 N.Y.U.J. INT’L L. 
& POL. 729 (2002). 
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so.88 Despite this, the German Constitutional court determined, in the 
decision known as Solange I, that the fundamental individual rights 
found in the German constitution take precedence over any 
conflicting doctrines developed by the ECJ.89 A basic reason given by 
the German court was that the government of the federal Republic 
never had a power to override inalienable constitutional rights to 
begin with, so it could not have delegated (alienated) such a power to 
any European institution through a treaty. In the subsequent 
Maastricht case, the German high court further held that an 
implausible ECJ interpretation of a treaty (i.e., one that went 
significantly beyond any reasonable interpretation of the treaty’s 
language), was ultra vires and thus amounted to a disguised attempt at 
a treaty amendment. Such a solely court-generated amendment, 
however, is impermissible, for it lacks the democratic legitimacy that 
would support a treaty amendment approved by European Union 
member states. A wholly implausible interpretation by the ECJ 
cannot, therefore, have domestic effects within Germany, according 
to Maastricht.90 
Judge García Sayán has stated that the application of this doctrine 
would enable the court’s jurisprudence to be “multiplied in hundreds 
or perhaps thousands of domestic courts in cases that it would never 
have been able to hear directly”91 and to become a source of 
 
88 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional 
Court] May 29, 1974, 37, 271 (Ger.). 
89 Id. A subsequent decision known as Solange II drastically raised the burden of proof 
on opponents of the ECJ but nevertheless reaffirmed that treaty interpretations in conflict 
with fundamental German constitutional rights do not in principle have domestic validity; 
see BVERFGE 73, 339 2 BvR 197/83. 
90 See Brunner and Others v. the European Union Treaty (The Maastricht Judgment), 
Bundesverfassungsgericht [BVERFG] [Federal Constitutional court, 2d Senate] Oct. 12, 
1993, 89 Entscheidungen des Bundesverfassungsgerichts [BVERFGE] 155 (F.R.G.), 2 BvR 
2134/92 & 2159/92, 1 C.M.L.R. 57, 105 (1994), 1993 WL 965303, at *105, cited in 
Richard Stith, Securing the Rule of Law Through Interpretive Pluralism: An Argument 
From Comparative Law, 35 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 401, 411 note 25 (2008). (“[I]n 
future, it will have to be noted as regards interpretation of enabling provisions by 
Community institutions and agencies that the Union Treaty as a matter of principle 
distinguishes . . . the amending of the Treaty, so that its interpretation may not have effects 
that are equivalent to an extension of the Treaty. Such an interpretation of enabling rules 
would not produce any binding effects for Germany.”). A recent and extensive 
reaffirmation by the Constitutional court of this view can be found in the Lisbon decision 
of 2009, BVERFG, 2 BvE 2/08 vom 30.6.2009, Absatz-Nr. ¶¶ 1–421, available at 
http://www .bverfg.de/entscheidungen/es20090630_2bve000208en.html. 
91 Diego García-Sayán, The Inter-American Court And Constitutionalism In Latin 
America, 89 TEX. L. REV. 1835, 1836 (2011). 
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doctrinary and jurisprudential inspiration for national courts.92 But the 
Inter-American Convention on Human Rights was never intended to 
produce the quasi-constitutional unity of the European Union treaties 
(nor that of the Latin American and Caribbean economic union 
treaties). So, a fortiori, the Inter-American Court has no power to 
make its treaty interpretations override inalienable and thus 
undelegable national constitutional rights. These rights include the 
fundamental right to life or the right to be considered a juridical 
person. Nor does the Court have the power to freely amend the 
Convention by means of an unbounded control de convencionalidad 
extending beyond the parties in a case to encompass every signatory 
nation and every individual therein without regard to the limits of 
democratic legitimacy. Indeed, in his dissenting opinion in Artavia, 
Judge Vio Grossi points out precisely that the Inter-American Court 
of Human Rights has no power to amend the treaty: “[T]he Court 
must interpret and apply the Convention, instead of assuming . . . the 
lawmaking function. The latter belongs to the States, which have the 
exclusive power to modify the Convention.”93 
At least one domestic court has already rejected application of the 
Artavia decision on this basis. The Federal Court of Salta, an 
Argentinian province, partially rejected a couple’s request based on 
Artavia for full insurance coverage of artificial reproductive 
technologies, holding that the decision was not binding on the state of 
Argentina, because it was not a party to the dispute.94 The court held 
Artavia’s rejection of the embryo’s personhood conflicted with 
Argentinian jurisprudence.95 The court observed that the control of 
compliance doctrine could only be found among the court’s own 
jurisprudence, and not in any independent source, thus providing no 
 
92 See Diego García Sayán, Exámenes del horizonte [Assessments from the horizon], in 
La reforma de la Comisión Interamericana de Derechos Humanos [Inter-American 
Commission on Human Rights Reform], 19 APORTES DPLF, REVISTA DE LA FUNDACIÓN 
PARA EL DEBIDO PROCESO 54 (2014), available at http://perso.unifr.ch/derechopenal 
/assets/files/obrasportales/op_20140508_03.pdf. 
93 Artavia, supra note 4, at 7–8 (Vio Grossi, J., dissenting). 
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evidence of a duty to follow the said doctrine.96 The court also 
reiterated the national Supreme Court’s authority over constitutional 
interpretation, including international treaties that became a part of 
domestic constitutional law and rejected the premise that the Inter-
American Court could legitimately interpret Argentinian 
constitutional law, which protects the unborn child.97 Likewise, a 
group of Argentinian academics adopted a statement indicating that 
the Artavia decision was not binding on Argentinian law.98 
Although judge García Sayán argues that states parties have 
accepted his control of conformity doctrine,99 the highest courts of 
Argentina, Mexico, and Uruguay have explicitly rejected the idea that 
Inter-American Court decisions have binding authority over domestic 
courts. The Uruguayan Supreme court, in the “Two Coronels” case, 
held that Inter-American Court decisions are only binding on 
domestic courts in their dispositive section, i.e., the resolution.100 It 
also held that the ultimate interpreter of the Uruguayan Constitution is 
the Uruguayan Supreme court, and that no duty to be bound by the 
Inter-American Court’s jurisprudence can be found in the American 
Convention.101 The Argentinian Supreme court stated that Inter-
American Court decisions have no binding authority over domestic 
courts but only “moral significance.”102 Likewise, the Mexican 
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Supreme court has found that Inter-American Court judgments to 
which Mexico was not a party may provide guidance to Mexican 
judges only as long as they favor the human person and the protection 
of his rights,103 not where their interpretation is more restrictive, or 
where domestic law grants greater protection than the American 
Convention. Even when courts have acknowledged or invoked Inter-
American Court decisions in their high court decisions, they have 
only attributed them non-binding authority.104 
Only one country seems to have adopted the control of conformity 
doctrine in its full form: Peru, García Sayán’s country of origin, 
where the Constitutional court held that the judgments of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, including their ratio decidendi, 
were “binding for all public authorities . . . , even in those cases in 
which the Peruvian State has not been a party to the proceedings.”105 
But even in that case, the Constitutional court of Peru specifically 
limited the judgments’ authority to the ratio decidendi and not the 
decision as a whole.106 
C. Artavia’s Potential Effects on the Inter-American Court’s 
Authority 
Controversial decisions, albeit on different issues, have historically 
raised among states parties a great deal of opposition and skepticism 
against the Commission, to the point where some states have sought 
to diminish its powers.107 Such tensions eventually led states parties to 
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carry out a comprehensive review of the IACHR’s functions108 that 
concluded in reform of its Rules of Procedure, among others.109 
Decisions like Artavia could, at least in theory, have a similar effect 
on states parties’ acceptance of the court’s authority. 
The court’s lack of flexibility in refusing to grant a state deference 
in controversial matters of moral relevance does little to reinforce its 
authority in the long term. Restricting national judges’ ability to 
interpret national Constitutions and imposing interpretative 
uniformity, according to the court’s personal views on human life, 
may dissuade states parties from submitting to its jurisdiction.110 
Furthermore, the requirement that Costa Rican judges and their staff 
be retrained in proper judging on matters of abortion and reproductive 
technologies,111 may strike some national judges as arrogant and 
paternalistic, while others could view such trainings as a tool of 
ideological imposition of pro-choice views on the judiciary. Such 
perceptions may dissuade states from increasing the Court and 
Commission’s funding, as members of both bodies have repeatedly 
requested.112 
Artavia’s disregard for national sovereignty may also dissuade 
non-parties to the treaty, like the United States, from ratifying the 
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American Convention. Even though state representatives may agree 
with some parts of the holding, the court’s overruling of a Supreme 
Court decision and the subsequent imposition of a duty to facilitate 
IVF through government agencies and provide government funds may 
prove unacceptable for traditional U.S. constitutional standards. For 
similar reasons, nonparties to the Inter-American Court’s Statute 
(Dominica, Grenada, and Jamaica) may be dissuaded from 
recognizing the court’s jurisdiction.113 
Furthermore, Artavia may weaken states parties’ perceptions on the 
enforceability of Inter-American Court decisions in general. Even for 
Costa Rica, a country that has so much invested in the Inter-American 
System on human rights, host to the Inter-American Court 
headquarters and the first state to ratify the American Convention,114 
compliance with the court’s unreasonable demands, specially in 
regard to IVF state subsidies, has been less than perfect. As of 
February of 2014, Costa Rica complied with the victim compensation 
mandate and the Executive, namely the Ministry of Health, has 
submitted a bill that would authorize and regulate IVF for 
congressional approval.115 But the country probably lacks the 
resources to provide subsidized IVF services in the near future,116 and 
it is uncertain that it ever will. Santiago Cantón stated that “despite 
the important markers of success of the Inter-American system on 
human rights, states do not fully comply with a large majority of its 
decisions,” and Artavia may be no exception.117 
Finally, the Artavia decision or subsequent similar decisions may 
alert the Organization of American States General Assembly to the 
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need for discussion of the court’s decisions and the Commission’s 
reports and activities in greater detail. Santiago Cantón indicates that: 
[T]oday, the combined time given to the Commission and the court 
during the General Assemblies is no more than fifteen minutes. 
Most of the time, there is absolutely no discussion of the activities 
carried out during the year by these two bodies. In the last fifteen 
years, the only discussions about the System took place in El 
Salvador in 2011 and Bolivia in 2012, and those instances were 
both to discuss the reform process, not necessarily to discuss 
strengthening the System.118 
CONCLUSION 
Due to the court’s limited jurisdiction under the American 
Convention, the Artavia decision should not have any direct effect 
anywhere other than Costa Rica. However, in practice, its rationale 
may be used to promote abortion rights in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. Individual states may give Artavia as much or as little 
authority as they want, given that nothing in the Convention mandates 
that non-parties to the dispute give it any authority at all, and that the 
doctrine of control of conformity has questionable acceptance. 
It is unlikely that Artavia will be deemed to be the final word on 
the interpretation the right to life from conception. The court’s biased 
interpretation of Article 4(1) in Artavia may, inevitably, succumb 
under its own weight and be overturned by a future composition of 
the Inter-American Court, since the court does not consistently follow 
the anglo-saxon doctrine of stare decisis.119 
In the long term, the decision may also motivate states parties to 
produce counter-legislation protecting the unborn, or to modify the 
court statute to amend its interpretation faculties. Judge Vio Grossi 
encouraged states to use their legislative faculties, warning that: 
If they fail to do so, there is the risk that—as it somewhat happens 
in this case—the court may not only decide on these issues, which 
require a more political pronouncement, but may also be obliged to 
assume this normative function. This would distort the court’s 
jurisdictional function, affecting thus the performance of the whole 
Inter-American system of human rights.120 
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